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Anxiety promotes memory for 
mood-congruent faces but does not 
alter loss aversion
Caroline J. Charpentier1,2,*, Chandni Hindocha1,3,*, Jonathan P. Roiser1,† & Oliver J. Robinson1,†
Pathological anxiety is associated with disrupted cognitive processing, including working memory and 
decision-making. In healthy individuals, experimentally-induced state anxiety or high trait anxiety 
often results in the deployment of adaptive harm-avoidant behaviours. However, how these processes 
affect cognition is largely unknown. To investigate this question, we implemented a translational 
within-subjects anxiety induction, threat of shock, in healthy participants reporting a wide range of 
trait anxiety scores. Participants completed a gambling task, embedded within an emotional working 
memory task, with some blocks under unpredictable threat and others safe from shock. Relative to the 
safe condition, threat of shock improved recall of threat-congruent (fearful) face location, especially in 
highly trait anxious participants. This suggests that threat boosts working memory for mood-congruent 
stimuli in vulnerable individuals, mirroring memory biases in clinical anxiety. By contrast, Bayesian 
analysis indicated that gambling decisions were better explained by models that did not include threat 
or treat anxiety, suggesting that: (i) higher-level executive functions are robust to these anxiety 
manipulations; and (ii) decreased risk-taking may be specific to pathological anxiety. These findings 
provide insight into the complex interactions between trait anxiety, acute state anxiety and cognition, 
and may help understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying adaptive anxiety.
Anxiety disorders constitute a major global health burden1, and are characterized by negative emotional process-
ing biases, as well as disrupted working memory and decision-making2,3. On the other hand, anxiety can also be 
an adaptive response to stress, stimulating individuals to engage in harm-avoidant behaviours. Influential the-
ories of pathological anxiety propose that clinical anxiety emerges through dysregulation of adaptive anxiety4,5. 
Therefore, in order to understand how this dysregulation emerges in pathological anxiety, it is crucial to first 
understand the cognitive features associated with adaptive or ‘non-pathological’ anxiety, in other words anxiety 
levels that can vary within and between individuals but do not result in the development of clinical symptoms 
associated with anxiety disorders.
Several methods exists to induce anxiety in healthy individuals, including threat of shock (ToS), the Trier 
social stressor test (TSST), and the cold pressor test (CPT). During the ToS paradigm, subjects typically perform 
a cognitive task while either at risk of or safe from rare, but unpleasant, electric shocks. Compared to the other 
methodologies, ToS has the advantage of allowing for within-subjects, within-sessions, designs (for a review 
on its effects on cognition, see Robinson et al.2), and ensures the task is performed while being anxious, rather 
than after being relieved from the stressor. In addition, ToS paradigms have good translational analogues6, are 
well-validated7, and are thus considered a reliable model for examining adaptive anxiety in healthy individuals.
Because the engagement of adaptive anxiety processes may vary with individuals’ vulnerability to developing 
pathological anxiety8–10, we were also interested in examining how the effects of state anxiety induced by threat 
of shock interact with dispositional or trait anxiety, as reflected in self-report questionnaire scores such as the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory11 (STAI). High levels of self-reported trait anxiety are indeed considered a strong 
vulnerability factor in the development of pathological anxiety4,12.
The extent to which induced state anxiety (elicited by the laboratory procedures discussed above) and 
trait anxiety interact to alter cognition has rarely been studied10. In particular, does induced anxiety have a 
1Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK. 2Affective Brain 
Lab, Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, UK. 3Clinical 
Psychopharmacology Unit, Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College 
London, WC1E 7HB. *These authors contributed equally to this work. †These authors jointly supervised this work. 
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to C.J.C. (email: caroline.charpentier.11@ucl.ac.uk)
Received: 22 December 2015
Accepted: 04 April 2016
Published: 21 April 2016
OPEN
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
2Scientific RepoRts | 6:24746 | DOI: 10.1038/srep24746
disproportionate impact on cognition in those individuals with high trait anxiety, and thus greater proneness to 
pathological anxiety? To answer this question, in the present study we combined a ToS paradigm with a task that 
concomitantly measures emotional working memory and economic decision-making9, testing healthy individu-
als with a wide range of trait anxiety scores.
Using this task, the aim of this study was to therefore test the impact of 1) induced (state) and 2) dispositional 
(trait) anxiety on a) working memory and b) decision-making.
Anxiety has been associated with working memory impairment, including anxiety induced by ToS13,14, indi-
viduals with high dispositional anxiety13,15, and clinical anxiety16,17. However, this has yet to be investigated using 
emotional stimuli, which are highly salient, and for which working memory is therefore likely to be enhanced 
regardless of anxiety18. People with high trait anxiety exhibit an enhanced response to negative stimuli, such as 
fearful faces, in attentional tasks2,19–21, consistent with a mood-congruent bias in the allocation of attentional 
resources.
Anxiety is also associated with important difficulties in making decisions. When faced with risky decisions, 
individuals with an anxiety disorder (see Table 1A for a summary of studies) or healthy individuals with high 
dispositional anxiety22–25 exhibit increased risk avoidant behaviour. However, evidence for an effect of acute state 
anxiety on risky decision-making is very mixed; the presence and direction of effects appear to vary substantially 
depending on the induction technique, the decision-making task, and individual differences in trait anxiety, age 
and gender (see Table 1B for a summary of studies).
Clark et al.26 found increased risk averse choices on a gambling task under threat, but only when the risky 
option contained a moderate loss or when both choice options involved only losses. When the risky option 
involved a high loss or when choosing between gain-only options, ToS had no effect on risk taking26. However, in 
this study, threat was not sustained, occurring only for short durations (5–5.5 s), making it more comparable to a 
fear-cueing paradigm than an anxiety induction. More recently, ToS was shown to interact with individual levels 
of trait anxiety to alter decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task, such that low anxious individuals took fewer 
risks under threat while high anxious individuals took more risks10. Most of the other studies listed in Table 1B 
A. Patients with anxiety disorders
Study Group Task
Effect on risk taking 
vs healthy individuals
Maner et al.23 (study 3)
Anxiety disorders, Mood 
disorders, Learning/no Axis 
1 disorders
RTBS (14-item version) ↓ in anxiety patients  = in other groups
Mueller et al.24 GAD IGT (modified) ↓ (specific to decisions with long-term loss)
Giorgetta et al.27 GAD, PAD PGT (lotteries) ↓ 
Ernst et al.28 GAD, SocPh, SAD (all adolescents) Loss aversion = 
Butler & Mathews29 GAD, MDD Questionnaire Overestimation of risk for negative events
B. Acute anxiety/stress induction in healthy individuals
Study Stressor Task Effect on risk taking
Raghunathan & Pham30 Anxious mood induction One-shot choice  between 2 gambles ↓ 
Lighthall et al.31 CPT BART ↑ in men  ↓ in women
Mather et al.32 CPT Driving task ↓ in older aduts  = in younger adults
Porcelli & Delgado33 CPT PGT (lotteries) ↓ in gain domain  ↑ in loss domain
Putman et al.34 Administration of cortisol PGT (lotteries)
↑ for high-risk gamble  
with large gain  
= otherwise
Clark et al.26 ToS (fear) PGT (lotteries) ↓ 
Pabst et al.35 TSST GDT (modified version) = in gain domain  ↓ in loss domain
Buckert et al.36 TSST PGT (lotteries) ↑ in gain domain  ↓ in loss domain
Robinson et al.10 ToS (anxiety) IGT ↓ in low trait anxious  ↑ in high trait anxious
Robinson et al.37 ToS (anxiety) Framing effect  Temporal discounting = 
Table 1.  Summary of effects of pathological anxiety disorders (A) and acute anxiety/stress induction  
(B) on risky decision-making. ↑ means increased risk taking; ↓ decreased risk taking, = no effect. CPT: Cold 
Pressor Test, ToS: Threat of Shock, TSST: Trier Social Stressor Test, BART: Balloon Analogue Risk Task, PGT: 
Probabilistic Gambling Task, GDT: Game of Dice Task, IGT: Iowa Gambling Task, RTBS: Risk-Taking Behaviors 
Scale, GAD: Generalized Anxiety Disorder, PAD: Panic Attack Disorder, MDD: Major Depressive Disorder, 
SocPh: Social Phobia, SAD: Separation Anxiety Disorder.
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did not examine individual differences in trait anxiety, so this is a possible explanation for the mixed evidence of 
induced stress on risky decisions. In addition, several studies suggest differential effects of stress in the gain and in 
the loss domain, suggesting that stress could act on risky decisions by altering loss aversion – the relative weight-
ing of losses over gains. Surprisingly, whether loss aversion is affected by induced anxiety has never been tested.
These findings led to a number of predictions. Firstly we predicted that both working memory and 
decision-making would be influenced by threat of shock. Specifically we hypothesized that a mood-congruent bias 
would be present for emotional working memory and enhanced by ToS19,21. With respect to decision-making, clin-
ical findings23,24,27 and the results of Clark et al.26 led us to predict that loss aversion would increase under ToS. In 
addition based on Robinson et al.10 and Charpentier et al.9, we predicted that these state anxiety induced changes 
would vary as a function of trait anxiety levels, with the most profound effects in those with high trait anxiety.
Results
Fifty-five participants (see Table 2 and Methods for more details) completed a task designed to measure emo-
tional influences on both working memory and economic decision-making (in particular loss aversion). A sim-
ilar version of this task was described previously9 and was adapted in the present experiment to include a ToS 
manipulation. The task consisted of 18 blocks, with participants completing nine threat blocks alternating with 
nine safe blocks (Fig. 1A). Whether the first block was safe or threat was counterbalanced across subjects. The trial 
structure is presented in Fig. 1B.
On each trial, participants were initially instructed to memorize the locations of two prime stimuli, both 
belonging to one of the following four conditions: happy faces, fearful faces, neutral faces, or objects (light bulbs). 
Participants then had to decide whether to accept or reject a risky gamble consisting of 50% chance to win the 
amount in green and 50% chance to lose the amount in red. Finally, one of the initial prime stimuli from the pair 
appeared (memory probe), and participants were asked to indicate whether it had been located on the left or the 
right of the first screen.
To investigate the effect of ToS, emotional condition, and trait anxiety on both working memory and gambling 
behaviour, the following variables were computed and analysed, using both a frequentist and a Bayesian approach 
(see Methods for details): working memory accuracy and reaction times, proportion of gambles accepted, gam-
bling decision reaction times, choice parameters extracted from Prospect Theory model, namely loss aversion 
and choice consistency38–40. Summary data from these variables are presented in Table 3, and detailed data are 
available for download (https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3160498.v1).
Manipulation checks. State anxiety. To check that the ToS manipulation produced the expected effects on 
state anxiety, participants completed the Short State Anxiety Inventory41 (SSAI) before starting the practice tasks 
and after completing the main task, retrospectively for the safe condition and for the threat condition (see Table 2 
for mean SSAI scores). They also answered the following 3 questions at the end of the study: “How anxious were 
you in the safe/threat condition?”, “How afraid were you in the safe/threat condition?”, and “How stressed were 
you in the safe/threat condition?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much so). Main effects of threat on 
the different ratings were analysed in repeated-measures ANOVAs, with mean centered trait anxiety added as a 
covariate. As expected there was a significant main effect of threat on SSAI (measured pre-task, post-task for safe, 
and post-task for threat: F(2,106) = 69.98, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.569). Participants retrospectively rated themselves as 
feeling significantly more anxious under threat in comparison to safe (t(53) = 9.38, p < 0.001). In comparison to 
baseline (before the start of the experiment) participants rated themselves as significantly more anxious during 
the threat condition (threat vs baseline: t(53) = 10.60, p < 0.001), while state anxiety levels did not differ signif-
icantly between baseline and the safe condition (safe vs baseline: t(53) = 1.48, p = 0.144). Similar results were 
found for single item retrospective ratings of ‘anxious’ (safe: M = 2.69, SD = 2.07; threat: M = 5.80, SD = 2.06; 
F(1,53) = 116.3, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.687), ‘stressed’ (safe: M = 2.15, SD = 1.43; threat M = 5.65, SD = 2.39; 
F(1,53) = 124.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.701) and ‘afraid’ (safe: M = 1.69, SD = 1.30; threat M = 5.13, SD = 2.11; 
F(1,53) = 159.6, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.751). Note that except for baseline rating on the SSAI, which was obtained 
before the experiment, all ratings relating to the threat and safe conditions were collected retrospectively after the 
end of the task.
Trait anxiety. Interestingly, the ToS manipulation was more effective in high anxious individuals. The increase 
in SSAI during threat blocks relative to baseline and safe blocks interacted with trait anxiety (threat by trait 
N = 55 Mean (SD)
Age (years) 24.15 (5.59)
Gender ratio (m:f) 24:31
BDI-II (total) 6.00 (6.98)
STAI (Trait) 38.92 (8.76)
SSAI prior to testing 10.16 (3.35)
SSAI for safe blocks 10.92 (3.37)
SSAI for threat blocks 15.98 (3.39)
Table 2.  Demographic data and questionnaire scores. BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory II; STAI: State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory; SSAI: Short State Anxiety Inventory. SSAI was administered before the task, as well as after 
the task with questions phrased retrospectively about the safe blocks and the threat blocks.
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anxiety interaction: F(2,106) = 3.279, p = 0.042, ηp2 = 0.058), such that high trait anxious individuals showed a 
greater threat-induced increase in state anxiety than low trait anxious individuals. This means that any effect of 
trait anxiety on memory or decision-making could be driven by individual differences in state anxiety induced 
by the stress manipulation. To account for this potential confound, the change in reported state anxiety between 
the threat and safe blocks was mean-corrected and added as an additional covariate in the ANOVAs in which an 
interaction with trait anxiety was identified.
Working memory performance: mood-congruent effects of threat. Working memory accuracy 
scores for each condition are reported in Table 3, and were analyzed after arcsine transformation in a 2 (threat: 
threat, safe) by 4 (emotion: happy, fearful, neutral, object) repeated-measures ANOVA, with trait anxiety added 
as a covariate.
State anxiety. There was no main effect of threat on working memory performance (F(1,53) = 1.54, p = 0.22, 
ηp2 = 0.028). There was a main effect of emotion (F(3,159) = 4.846, p= 0.003, ηp2 = 0.084), as well as a significant 
emotion-by-threat interaction (F(3,159) = 3.311, p = 0.022, ηp2 = 0.059), driven by worse memory performance 
for the object condition, especially under threat, suggesting that the emotional content of faces per se does not 
alter the recall of their location. A Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed these results, with substantial 
evidence against a main effect of threat (Bayes Factor representing evidence for the model of interest over the 
null model: BF10 = 0.176) and for a main effect of emotion (BF10 = 9.74). However, adding the emotion-by-threat 
interaction to a model already containing a main effect of emotion, did not improve the model (BF10 ratio between 
the two models = 0.945).
Trait anxiety. There was a significant emotion-by-threat-by-trait anxiety interaction on working memory 
accuracy (F(3,159) = 3.34, p = 0.021, ηp2 = 0.059), as well as a significant two-way interaction between emotion 
and trait anxiety (F(3,159) = 3.715, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 0.065), but no main effect of trait anxiety (F(1,53) = 0.179, 
p = 0.67, ηp2 = 0.003). Importantly, the interactions with trait anxiety remained significant after controlling for 
the change in self-reported state anxiety after threat relative to safe blocks (emotion-by-trait anxiety interac-
tion: F(3,156) = 2.747, p = 0.045, ηp2 = 0.050; emotion-by-threat by-trait anxiety interaction: F(3,156) = 3.885, 
p = 0.010, ηp2 = 0.070). Post-hoc analysis of the three-way interaction revealed a significant positive correlation 
between trait anxiety and threat-induced improvement in working memory for fearful faces (r(55) = 0.316, 
Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) Task structure: 18 blocks were segregated into 9 safe (blue) and 9 threat 
(orange) alternating blocks. Each block lasted between 19–24 trials, the sum of which was 196 trials for safe and 
for threat. This was to ensure participants could not count the block length. The initial safe or threat block was 
counterbalanced across participants. Asterisks represent where in each threat block a shock was delivered, if at 
all. Shocks could be delivered during the first or second fixation cross of the trial (this was also randomized). 
Six shocks were delivered across the 9 threat blocks, such that the threat that a shock could happen at any time 
was still present, and participants could not know for sure that after receiving a shock no other shock would 
follow in that block. In total there were 49 trials per emotion. (B) Trial structure: at the beginning of each block 
participants were informed whether they were in a threat or safe block; throughout the block the corresponding 
color (threat: orange; safe: blue) was maintained in the frame of the screen. On each trial they were presented 
with a pair of faces or objects to memorize for 3 seconds. Note that the figure is schematic, in the task we used 
pictures of real faces from the NimStim face stimulus set (http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm), and 
pictures of light bulbs as objects. After a short fixation cross, they then had to decide whether to accept or reject 
a mixed gamble with 50% chance to win the amount in green and 50% chance to lose the amount in red. Finally, 
they had to indicate the position in which the probe face/object had been on the first screen.
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p = 0.019, Fig. 2A). Interestingly, there was also a significant negative correlation between trait anxiety and 
threat-induced change in working memory for neutral faces (r(55) = − 0.304, p = 0.024, Fig. 2B). These corre-
lations differed significantly (Steiger’s Z = 3.34, p < 0.001) and there was no correlation between trait anxiety 
and threat-induced change in memory performance for happy faces (r(55) = 0.091, p = 0.51, Fig. 2C) and for 
objects (r(55) = 0.010, p = 0.61, Fig. 2D). In other words these results suggest that threat improves working mem-
ory accuracy for fearful faces in highly anxious individuals; however, highly anxious individuals had relatively 
impaired working memory for neutral faces when under threat. A Bayesian test was performed to corroborate 
this effect. In particular the correlation between trait anxiety and the difference in working memory accuracy for 
fearful relative to neutral faces between threat and safe conditions (r(55) = 0.448) revealed a BF10 of 51.6, indica-
tive of very strong evidence in favour of this interaction, relative to the null model.
Propensity to gamble is unaffected by anxiety. Gambling scores for each condition are reported 
in Table 3. On average, participants accepted the gamble on 47.14% of trials (SD = 11.76), suggesting that 
the  tailoring procedure to create the gamble matrix according to each participant’s indifference point had oper-
ated effectively. With this maximized sensitivity, we then investigated whether propensity to gamble was modu-
lated by the experimental conditions by performing a similar repeated-measures ANOVA to the one described 
above.
Mean(SD) Safe Happy Safe Fearful Safe Neutral Safe Object Threat Happy Threat Fearful Threat Neutral Threat Object
Working memory  
(proportion correct) 0.9271 (0.086) 0.9226 (0.094) 0.9295 (0.096) 0.8986 (0.102) 0.9313 (0.089) 0.9219 (0.089) 0.9237 (0.096) 0.9190 (0.090)
Gambling (proportion accepted) 0.4713 (0.118) 0.4616 (0.125) 0.4684 (0.125) 0.4834 (0.127) 0.4760 (0.120) 0.4664 (0.123) 0.4632 (0.121) 0.4820 (0.125)
Loss aversion (λ parameter) 1.9308 (1.329) 1.9427 (1.287) 1.9341 (1.375) 1.8876 (1.231) 1.9137 (1.362) 1.9123 (1.257) 1.9352 (1.319) 1.9081 (1.396)
Choice consistency (μ parameter) 2.8746 (1.958) 2.5142 (1.882) 2.6830 (1.867) 2.6455 (1.809) 2.7328 (1.915) 2.4924 (1.816) 2.8493 (1.950) 2.5894 (1.855)
Working memory reaction times  
(in seconds) 0.7453 (0.013) 0.7481 (0.017) 0.7428 (0.016) 0.7796 (0.015) 0.7305 (0.014) 0.7332 (0.014) 0.7346 (0.014) 0.7635 (0.015)
Gambling reaction times  
(in seconds) 0.9519 (0.172) 0.9538 (0.168) 0.9480 (0.168) 0.9581 (0.156) 0.9387 (0.164) 0.9407 (0.159) 0.9406 (0.164) 0.9434 (0.166)
Table 3.  Summary of cognitive outcome variables (N = 55). Means (standard deviations) are reported for 
each experimental condition and each dependent variable (untransformed) analysed in the study.
Figure 2. Threat-induced changes in working memory. Differences in working memory performance 
(arcsine-transformed proportion correct) between threat and safe blocks were calculated for each emotion 
condition and correlated with trait anxiety. Trait anxiety was associated with (A) a threat-induced improvement 
in working memory for fearful faces, such that highly anxious participants were more accurate in remembering 
the location of a fearful face under threat; and (B) with a threat-induced impairment in working memory for 
neutral faces, such that highly anxious participants were less accurate in remembering the location of a neutral 
face under threat. There was no association between trait anxiety and threat-induced changes in working 
memory for happy faces (C) and objects (D) condition. *p < 0.05, two-tailed Pearson correlation.
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State anxiety. There was no main effect of threat (F(1,53) = 0.026, p = 0.87) and no interactions reached signif-
icance (all Fs < 1.1, all Ps > 0.35). We did find a significant main effect of emotion (F(3,159) = 4.574, p = 0.004, 
ηp2 = 0.079); however, this effect was entirely driven by a greater propensity to gamble in the object condition 
relative to the fearful (t(54) = 3.22, p = 0.002) and neutral (t(54) = 2.90, p = 0.005) conditions. These results were 
confirmed by the Bayes Factor analysis revealing that the null model performed substantially better (9.2 times) 
than a model including only a main effect of threat (BF10 = 0.108), suggesting that gambling is not affected by 
ToS. Consistent with the main effect of emotion evidenced above, the Bayesian analysis also showed that a model 
including only a main effect of emotion performed strongly better (BF10 = 17.42) than the null model. However, 
this effect was again driven by the object condition, suggesting that the emotional content of faces per se do not 
influence gambling decisions.
Trait anxiety. There was no main effect of trait anxiety (F(1,53) = 0.193, p = 0.66) and no interaction with trait 
anxiety that reached significance (all Fs < 1.1, all Ps > 0.35) when analyzing propensity to gamble data. These 
results were confirmed by the Bayes Factor analysis revealing that the null model performed strongly better (23.5 
times) than a model that included main effects of threat, emotion, trait anxiety, and a threat-by-emotion interac-
tion (BF10 = 0.043).
Choice parameters: loss aversion and choice consistency are also unaffected by anxiety. 
Modelling loss aversion and choice consistency from participants’ choice data (see Methods for details of the 
modelling procedure) provided a more fine-grained insight into individual differences in gambling behavior. 
The Prospect Theory-derived model of choice was estimated successfully in all 55 participants (mean R2 = 0.656, 
range = 0.27–0.91). Estimated for each participant across all trials, mean loss aversion was 1.92 (SD = 1.31, 
range = 0.60–7.14, see Table 3 for data in each condition), consistent with previous literature suggesting that 
people weight losses about twice as much as gains when making a decision40,42–44. Mean choice consistency was 
2.35 (SD = 1.65, range = 0.34–6.0, see Table 3 for data in each condition).
State anxiety. No significant main effects of threat, emotion or threat-by-emotion interaction were identified for 
loss aversion (all Fs < 1.4, all Ps > 0.25) or choice consistency (all Fs < 1.8, all Ps > 0.16) in the repeated-measures 
ANOVA. These null effects were confirmed by Bayes Factor analysis. For loss aversion, the null model performed 
substantially (8.9 times) better than the model including only a main effect of threat (BF10 = 0.112) and strongly 
(14.5 times) better than a model including only a main effect of emotion (BF10 = 0.069). For choice consist-
ency, the null model also performed substantially (9.5 times) better than the model including only a main effect 
of threat (BF10 = 0.105) and strongly (10.6 times) better than a model including only a main effect of emotion 
(BF10 = 0.094). These analyses suggest that loss aversion and choice consistency are not affected by threat or inci-
dental emotional primes.
Trait anxiety. No significant main effects of or interactions with trait anxiety were identified for loss aversion (all 
Fs < 1.4, all Ps > 0.25) or choice consistency (all Fs < 1.8, all Ps > 0.16) in the threat-by-emotion-by-trait anxiety 
ANOVA. Again these null effects were confirmed by Bayes Factor analysis. For loss aversion, the null model per-
formed decisively (1,896 times) better than the full model (threat + emotion + threat-by-emotion + trait anxiety: 
BF10 = 0.00053). For choice consistency, the null model performed decisively (6,747 times) better than the full 
model (threat + emotion + threat-by-emotion + trait anxiety: BF10 = 0.00015). These analyses suggest that loss 
aversion and choice consistency are not additionally affected by trait anxiety.
Working memory reaction times: threat induces a general speeding of responses. A similar 
ANOVA (with emotion, threat and trait anxiety as factors) was run on reaction times to indicate the location of 
the memory probe (see Table 3 for reaction times in each condition).
State anxiety. We found a main effect of threat (F(1,53) = 5.051, p = 0.029, ηp2 = 0.087), such that participants 
were faster overall under threat relative to safe (Fig. 3A). There was also a significant main effect of emotion 
(F(1,53) = 11.26, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.175), driven by slower responses in the object condition (mean ± SD = 772 ms 
± 104) relative to all face conditions (happy = 738 ms ± 98, t(54) = 4.32; fearful = 741 ms ± 109, t(54) = 3.85; neu-
tral = 739 ms ± 107, t(54) = 4.62; all p < 0.001).
Bayesian analysis confirmed that the best model of working memory reaction times included a main effect of 
threat, as well as a main effect of emotion (ln(BF10) = 12.51) indicative of decisive evidence for this model relative 
to the null model. This model was also very strongly (39.3 times) better than a model additionally including the 
threat-by-emotion interaction (ln(BF10) = 8.84).
Trait anxiety. We did not observe an interaction with or a main effect of trait anxiety on working memory 
reaction times (all Fs < 1.1, all Ps > 0.4). Bayesian analysis confirmed that adding trait anxiety to a model 
already including main effects of threat and emotion did not improve the model (BF10 ratio between the two 
models = 0.559).
Gambling decision reaction times. A similar ANOVA was used to analyze reaction times for gambling 
decisions (see Table 3 for reaction times in each condition), with gamble choice (whether gamble is accepted or 
rejected) as an additional factor.
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State anxiety. Participants were significantly faster to decide whether to gamble or not under threat (main effect 
of threat: F(1,53) = 7.07, p = 0.010, ηp2 = 0.118, Fig. 3B). They were also faster at deciding to accept a gamble than 
at deciding to reject it (main effect of gamble choice: F(1,53) = 4.567, p = 0.037, ηp2 = 0.079). No other main or 
interaction effects reached significance (all Fs < 2.1, all Ps > 0.1). These results were corroborated using Bayes 
Factor analysis. A model including both a main effect of threat and a main effect of gamble choice on gambling 
reaction times performed decisively better than the null model (ln(BF10) = 11.73). These results on gambling 
reaction times suggest that regardless of trait anxiety participants were faster to make economic decisions under 
threat.
Trait anxiety. We found a significant emotion-by-trait anxiety interaction (F(3,159) = 3.219, p = 0.024, 
ηp2 = 0.057) on gambling decision reaction time. This interaction was driven by a negative correlation between 
trait anxiety and the difference in gamble reaction time between happy and fearful conditions (r = − 0.359, 
p = 0.007, Fig. 3C). No other interaction effects or main effect of trait anxiety reached significance (all Fs < 2.1, 
all Ps > 0.1). Bayes Factor analysis showed that a model with a correlation between trait anxiety and reaction time 
difference between happy and fearful conditions performed substantially (5.71 times) better than the null model. 
This suggests that high anxious individuals were slower to make economic decisions specifically when primed 
with fearful faces.
Discussion
The present study demonstrates that while ToS and emotion interact to alter working memory performance in 
a trait anxiety-dependent fashion, gambling decisions, and particularly loss aversion, are largely robust to these 
manipulations and do not vary with trait anxiety in our sample of healthy subjects. We also identified a general 
speeding of both gambling and working memory responses during ToS.
We found that highly trait anxious people under high state anxiety (induced by ToS) exhibit improved 
working memory for the location of fearful faces. This pattern was reversed for neutral faces. This suggests a 
threat-potentiated improvement in working memory for mood-congruent stimuli: while high trait anxious peo-
ple memorise fearful faces better when their state anxiety is also high, low anxious people memorise neutral 
Figure 3. Effects of threat, emotion and trait anxiety on reaction times. Both working memory (A) and 
gamble (B) responses are speeded by threat. (C) The difference in reaction times to make an economic decision 
between happy and fearful prime conditions correlates negatively with trait anxiety across individuals. Highly 
anxious individuals make slower decisions following fearful faces. Error bars represent SEM. *p < 0.05.
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faces better when their state anxiety is high. This interpretation is in line with findings that high state anxiety 
can enhance processing of affectively-congruent stimuli, in this case fearful faces that convey the most relevant 
signal to individuals anticipating an aversive shock19,20,45. Interestingly, we additionally show in this study that this 
enhancement is specific to those individuals who exhibit high dispositional anxiety. This could be explained by 
improved perceptual sensitivity for fearful cues under ToS in high trait anxious individuals46, and may indicate 
that high trait anxiety boosts the selectivity of threat-induced state anxiety47.
Despite these effects on working memory accuracy for fearful faces, contrary to predictions no effect of threat 
or interaction with the emotional content of face primes were observed on gambling decisions. We observed 
this absence of effect in two analyses; using a simple analysis of participants’ propensity to gamble, as well as a 
Prospect Theory-derived modelling approach to estimate loss aversion and choice consistency. Using Bayesian 
analysis, our results provide substantial to strong evidence that loss aversion (i) does not vary with trait anxiety 
(consistent with Ernst et al.28), and (ii) is robust to state anxiety and emotional manipulation (consistent with 
Engelmann et al.48 and Robinson et al.37). We initially hypothesized that loss aversion would either increase under 
ToS (as predicted by Clark et al.26) or vary under ToS as a function of individual levels of trait anxiety (as predicted 
by Charpentier et al.9 and Robinson et al.10), but this was not established. In fact Bayesian analysis revealed the 
best model of loss aversion to be the null model; with lower evidence for models including incidental emotion, 
induced state anxiety and trait anxiety, indicating that none of these factors impact loss aversion. A potential 
limitation that could explain the absence of effects is the fact that our gambling task only included mixed gam-
bles (between a loss and a gain), but not gain-only or loss-only gambles. This prevented us from distinguishing 
between loss aversion and risk preference in our Prospect Theory model. While loss aversion may be unaffected 
by state or trait anxiety, it is possible that risk preference in either the gain and/or in the loss domain, could be 
sensitive to these factors. We also observed that propensity to gamble was reduced following the incidental pres-
entation of face relative to object stimuli, suggesting that exposition to faces, regardless of emotional expression, 
may result in more conservative decisions and less risk-taking. However, this effect was not present when exam-
ining loss aversion parameters, and should therefore be taken with caution.
Explicit decisions were not impacted by trait anxiety, induced state anxiety or incidental emotion; however we 
find that decision reaction times were affected, suggesting a more implicit effect of threat-induced state anxiety 
and emotional cues on gambling decisions. First, we found that reaction times to make these gambling deci-
sions, but also reaction times to remember the location of the memory probe, were faster under threat. This 
threat-induced speeding of subsequent decisions has been observed in recent risky decision-making tasks 
performed under threat26,37,48, despite the absence of effects of threat on decisions. However, the fact that this 
speeding in reaction times is also present for the memory task suggests a more general threat-induced and 
task-independent speeding of cognitive processes.
Second, we also demonstrate that reaction times to gamble are altered by the emotional content of the stim-
uli preceding the gamble in a manner that depends on trait anxiety. Specifically, high anxious individuals were 
slower to decide whether to gamble after seeing fearful faces; while low anxious individuals were slower to make 
decisions after seeing happy faces. This finding may be explained by greater distractibility by affectively-congruent 
stimuli. In particular, there is clear evidence that high anxious individuals are more distracted by task-irrelevant 
fearful faces compared to low anxious individuals49–52. According to this explanation, high anxious individuals 
have slowed responses because they preferentially attend to (and are distracted by) fearful faces, thus making 
engaging with the gambling task more effortful. Note that this effect was not affected by ToS, suggesting that 
while state anxiety influences the memory encoding of emotional faces, it does not interact with the impact of 
emotional faces on task-irrelevant processes.
The fact that we demonstrate clear effects of state and trait anxiety on working memory, but not on higher 
order decision-making, may be because threat specifically alters lower level, bottom-up processes, such as encod-
ing of and perceptual sensitivity to fearful faces20,46, while leaving higher order, top-down processes intact37. 
Interestingly, Engelmann et al.48 showed that despite an absence of threat-effects on loss aversion, the neural 
encoding of gain and loss value in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum, and insula changed under 
threat. It is possible that while these lower level valuation systems in the brain were altered by threat-induced 
state anxiety, the more “deliberative” processes (such as value integration and comparison) were not, resulting in 
unchanged gambling decisions. This mechanism – state anxiety altering low-level, but not high-level processes – 
may be adaptive, as it can improve detection and adaptation to changes in the environment while preserving the 
ability to make more deliberative, controlled, decisions even in anxiogenic environments.
Potential improvements in future studies could include an objective, physiological measure of state anxiety 
induced by threat of shock (e.g. skin conductance response), to ensure consistency with self-reported state anxi-
ety. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized from extensive prior work that threat of shock has been shown to relia-
bly and concomitantly increase self-report2, physiological (e.g. startle response7) and neural6,20 markers of anxiety.
Taken together, our findings provide insights into how state anxiety and trait anxiety interact to alter cogni-
tion. They also provide a framework to better understand the cognitive mechanisms by which ‘non-pathological’ 
anxiety may be adaptive.
Methods
Participants. Fifty-six participants took part in this experiment; however, trait anxiety and personality data 
were not available for one participant and analyses are therefore reported for n = 55 participants (31 female: 24 
male; mean age = 24.15, SD = 5.59, see Table 2 for demographics and questionnaire scores). Based on effect sizes 
from previous related work (d = 0.45 for a meta-analysis of threat-related attentional biases in anxiety21, d = 0.40 
for the decrease in gambling behavior under ToS26), a power calculation using G*power (version 3.1.9.2)53 
revealed that a sample size of 55 would achieve between 83% and 90% power to detect such effects with an alpha 
of 0.05. Ethical approval was obtained from the UCL Research Ethics Committee and the study was carried out 
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in accordance with the approved protocol. Participants were recruited via responses to an advertisement through 
institutional mailing lists and provided written, informed consent. All participants completed an online screen-
ing form to determine whether they satisfied inclusion criteria. In particular, subjects were recruited if they were 
currently healthy (i.e. reported no current illness, psychiatric or otherwise), and reported no current drug use 
(including psychiatric drugs). Exclusion criteria were: a) treatment, diagnosis or medication for any psychiatric 
condition (lifetime), b) history of alcohol or substance dependence (lifetime) or recent abuse, or c) illegal drug 
use in the last month.
Emotional working memory and decision-making task. On each trial of the task (Fig. 1B), partic-
ipants were initially instructed to memorize the locations of two prime stimuli on the screen for 3 seconds, fol-
lowed by a delay of 500 ms. Both prime stimuli belonged to one of the following four conditions: happy faces, 
fearful faces, neutral faces, or objects (light bulbs). A gamble then appeared for 2 s, during which participants 
had to decide whether to accept or reject the gamble, followed by another delay of 500 ms. Finally, one of the 
initial faces/objects from the pair appeared (memory probe), and participants were asked to indicate whether it 
had been located on the left or the right of the first screen. In total participants completed 392 trials, 49 in each 
of 8 conditions (4 prime conditions * 2 threat conditions). Block lengths ranged between 19 and 24 trials, so that 
participants were not able to anticipate when exactly a block would end.
Stimuli. Face stimuli consisted of pictures from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (http://www.macbrain.org/
resources.htm). A set of 40 identities was chosen (20 male faces and 20 female faces), and each face stimulus was 
presented depicting either a neutral, happy, or fearful expression, resulting in a set of 120 face stimuli (primes). 
For the object control condition, 20 pictures of light bulbs were selected. All stimuli were resized to a resolution of 
200 (width) × 300 (height) pixels and were displayed on a black background using Cogent 2000 (www.vislab.ucl.
ac.uk/cogent.php) running under Matlab.
State anxiety manipulation. Acute anxiety was induced by unpredictable electrical shocks delivered using 
a Digitimer DS7A Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer Ltd., Welwyn Garden City, UK), with two electrodes 
secured to the wrist (as per Robinson et al.10). Each participant completed a shock thresholding procedure, con-
sisting of a few (usually 2 to 5) electrical shocks of increasing intensity, to reach a level of ‘painful but tolerable’ i.e. 
4 on a scale from 1 (no sensation) to 5 (painful and not tolerable).
Threat and safe blocks were indicated by an orange screen with ‘YOU ARE NOW AT RISK OF SHOCK’ or 
a blue screen with ‘YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK’ displayed for 3 seconds at the start of each block 
(Fig. 1B), and throughout the block by an orange or blue border, indicating threat or safe, respectively. A total 
of 6 shocks was delivered across the 9 threat blocks (see asterisks in Fig. 1A for approximate position of shock 
delivery throughout the task). On each of these six shock trials, the shock was either administered during the 
first or second fixation cross. Participants were informed that shocks would be unpredictable and independent of 
performance on the gambling and memory tasks.
Procedure. Participants completed an online screening questionnaire as described above. If eligible, they 
were invited to the testing session. Participants first completed the Short State Anxiety Inventory (SSAI)41. They 
then practiced a 20-trial version of the emotional working memory task (without the concurrent gambling task) 
in which they had to memorise the position of the two faces presented on the screen, and then after a delay of 
3 seconds, reported the previous location of the stimulus displayed on the centre of the screen. Participants then 
practiced 49 trials of the gambling task without the concurrent memory task. Participants were presented with 
mixed gambles with a 50% probability of winning an amount written in green, and 50% chance of losing an 
amount written in red, and had to decide whether to take (accept) the gamble or not (reject). These gambling-only 
trials were used to estimate each participant’s indifference point, such that the 7*7 gain/loss matrix for the main 
task could be centred on this indifference point in order to maximize sensitivity. Participants then practiced a 
40-trial version of the task that included both the gambling and the emotional working memory components 
(equivalent to Fig. 1B but excluding the stress manipulation). The electrodes were then attached, the shock thresh-
olding procedure was completed, and participants completed the 18 blocks of the main experiment (50 min). 
Payment was incentive-compatible, such that participants started the task with an initial £15, and the average 
outcome of 10 randomly selected choices (across the whole task) was added to the £15 to determine their final 
payment.
Participants provided self-report measures of depression (Beck Depression Inventory54; BDI) trait anxiety 
(STAI11).
Statistical analysis. Matlab (www.mathworks.com) was used to extract and process the data, IBM SPSS 
Statistics (version 21) for frequentist analyses and JASP55,56 (version 0.7.1) for Bayesian analyses. Trials were 
excluded if the participant failed to respond to the gamble. The probability of accepting the gamble (Paccept), 
mean reaction time (RT) to accept or reject the gamble, number of missed trials, and working memory accu-
racy and reaction times were calculated for each emotional condition (Happy, Fear, Neutral and Object) and 
threat condition (Threat, Safe) separately. Working memory scores were arcsine-transformed as they were skewed 
towards very high accuracy. Gamble acceptance rate and working memory performance were analysed using 
repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) in order to assess the impact of (i) emotion prime condition, 
(ii) state anxiety manipulation (threat versus safe blocks) and (iii) their interaction. Trait anxiety scores were mean 
corrected and added as a continuous covariate (trait anxiety scores were normally distributed – Shapiro-Wilk test 
statistic: 0.980, p = 0.51). Significant interactions were followed up with post-hoc t-tests and/or Pearson’s corre-
lations with trait anxiety.
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Bayesian analyses were conducted to corroborate significant effects, as well as to provide evidence for null 
effects. Contrary to classical frequentist approaches, Bayesian analyses can provide evidence in favour of the 
null model, by showing that the data are better explained by the null model than any other models. The analysis 
compares different models of the data (e.g. including various combinations of main effects and/or interactions 
of interest) with the null model (model without main effect or interaction), allowing to draw inference about 
which model best explains the data. In practice, Bayesian ANOVAs, correlations, and t-tests were used to gen-
erate Bayes Factors (BF10), which represent the evidence for a model of interest relative to a null model (main 
effect of subject; 1 versus 0)57,58. A BF10 greater than 1 means that the model of interest performs better than the 
null model; a BF10 smaller than 1 constitutes evidence in favour of the null model. We used the magnitude of the 
BF10 as an index to interpret the strength of evidence59,60. Evidence in favour of the model of interest is consid-
ered anecdotal (1 < BF10 < 3), substantial (3 < BF10 < 10), strong (10 < BF10 < 30), very strong (30 < BF10 < 100) 
or decisive (BF10 > 100). Similarly, evidence in favour of the null model could also be qualified as anecdotal 
(0.33 < BF10 < 1), substantial (0.1 < BF10 < 0.33), strong (0.033 < BF10 < 0.1), very strong (0.01 < BF10 < 0.033) 
or decisive (BF10 < 0.01). When BF10 was greater than 100, we report its natural logarithm (ln(BF10)) for ease of 
interpretation. In order to compare the relative predictive success of one model over another, the BF10 of the first 
model was divided by the BF10 of the other model, and the value of this ratio interpreted in terms of strength of 
evidence using the same values as above.
Loss aversion modelling. In order to assess loss aversion a model was estimated based on Prospect Theory’s 
subjective utility function38–40, using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure in Matlab. For each trial, the 
subjective utility (u) of each gamble was estimated using the following equation (with losses coded as negative 
values):
= . + . λ⁎ ⁎ ⁎u(gamble) 0 5 gain 0 5 loss (1)
where λ is the “loss aversion” parameter: λ > 1 indicates an overweighing of gains relative to losses and λ < 1 the 
converse. These subjective utility values were used in a softmax function to estimate the probability of accepting 
each gamble (coded as 0 or 1 for each rejected or accepted gamble, respectively):
= + −µ −⁎p(gamble acceptance) (1 exp( u(gamble))) (2)1
where μ is the logit sensitivity or “inverse temperature” parameter, an index of choice consistency for repeated 
identical gambles, equivalent to the maximal slope of a logistic regression curve: higher μ values indicate more 
consistent choices.
In order to assess whether loss aversion or choice consistency were altered by emotion or state anxiety, λ and μ 
values were estimated separately for each emotion condition and for safe and threat blocks and analysed similarly 
to gamble acceptance and working memory data. Due to high skewness values, μ values were square root trans-
formed and λ values were log transformed before being entered into the ANOVAs.
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